DOKUMENTATION
Stand: 6/97
Communications Programmes For EUROPABIO
January 1997
Prepared by Burson-Marsteller Government & Public Affairs
Contents of this proposal
1. Burson-Marsteller Government & Public Affairs Europe submit in response to a three-fold request from EuropaBio for:
1) A communication strategy and programme responding to the urgent circumstances now confronting agri-food bioindustries in Europe.
2) A communication programme for the first European Bioindustry Congress set for late June in Amsterdam.
3) A long-term communications strategy and programme.
2. Proposals are made of each of these specific requests (including very prelimenary fee estimates for the first two). But it is self-evident that each of these initiatives must complement and contribute to the other two. Moreover, each will (we assume) involve many of the same individuals operating through EuropaBio at both - the strategy level and the operational level. We therefore preface our specific proposals with a discussion of the common strategic principles which we believe should apply to all three.
Burson-Marsteller and Bioindustry issues
3. The Burson-Marsteller Government & Public Affairs practice is a single worldwide team of public affairs specialists (not a network of all-purpose national PR subsidiaries). In Europe, we cover the institutions of the European Union (via Robinson Linton Associates, a fully integrated member of the team), all 15 member states of the European Union, Norway and Switzerland, a growing number of Central and East European countries, and a growing number of CIS countries. No other government & public affairs communications group is constituted as a single, borderless business entity across Europe, and none has B-M’s reach and depth.
4. Within the practice, there functions are dedicated ‘bio-issues network’, linking together all team members with experience and involvement in these issues. Leadership responsibility for the network rests with Jean Christophe Alquier in Paris. In Europe, this experience and involvement is particularly developed at the EU level (Robinson Linton Associates), as well as in Germany, France, Denmark, the UK and Belgium. On-going client relationships attached to one or more of these (and several other) offices include a number of EuropaBio members.
5. In addition to our Public Affairs Practise, Burson-Marsteller has a number of other fully constituted practices functioning on the same single team basis around the world. Notable among these in the EuropaBio context is our Health Care practice, which is the acknowledged communications services leader for these sectors in Europe and worldwide. Client relationships likewise exist with certain EuropaBio members through the sister practice, and B-M service teams routinely include individuals from both practices.
The basis for this proposal
6. This proposal draws primarily on the cumulative experience of the B-M Public Affairs practice, and more particularly on that of our ‘bio-issues network’, as well as on relevant experience from our Health Care colleagues.
7. We also note that B-M colleagues in Brussels have been associated with EUFIC (The European Food Information Council) since it’s inception, a grouping which includes a number of EuropaBio members and which continues to devote part of it’s efforts to biotechnology issues in the food industry. This experience also underlies these proposals.
8. Finally, by way of introduction, we note that some of the key judgements shaping these proposals are based on very recent professional research into public attitudes in Europe toward biotechnology in general and biotechnology in the food chain in particular. We have been accorded access to the results of this work and permission to make generic reference to it in this proposal, but are not yet in a position to cite it specifically. Despite this limitation we stress here the enormous value for our own further understanding and insight of having seen it.
Indeed, we cannot over-emphasise the vital role such research plays in conceiving and executing any effective public and communications effort. Flying without it is literally flying blind. Moreover, progress in changing public attitudes can only be measured objectively against an initial baseline - and such measurements are the only reliable criteria for judging success.
Just as no successful company guesses what consumers think of it’s products, so no serious politician today operates without on-going attitude research - and no effective advocacy group does either. But allocation of the necessary resources to attitude research remains the exception rather than the rule in industry’s public affairs campaigning. This means, quite simply, that adversaries and politicians always have a good idea of what the public really thinks, but industry often doesn’t. (We return to this issue in our long-term strategy proposal).
A different approach
9. EuropaBio’s antecedent organisations (SAGB and ESNBA) have over the past several years firmly established themselves as the primary representatives of European bioindustrial interests within the political and regulatory structures of Europe. EuropaBio now assumes this indispensable direct role in the policy-making process. But it has become self-evident thast this role is no longer in itself sufficient to ensure the supportive environment Europe’s bioindustries need to achieve global competitiveness through the new biotechnologies. A sustained communications strategy and programme, able to generate favourable perceptions and opinions beyond the policy world, is now essential. 10. We emphasise this point because it leads to the following key observation: success in this new effort will require a much different approach from the one typically used by EuropaBio in it’s communication to the policy world. In our experience, the key to success will be the speed and degree to which EuropaBio members actually embrace the need for a different approach and then follow through on it. 11. The fundamental difference itself is, moreover, straightforward: in order to effect the desired changes in public perceptions and attitudes, the bioindustries must stop trying to be their own advocates. That approach often works in the policy world. It quite demonstrably hasn’t worked and won’t work in the sphere of public perceptions.
Basic strategy disciplines
12. We believe that four basic strategic disciplines must shape any EuropaBio communications initiative:
Stay off the killing fields
Create positive perceptions
Fight fire with fire
Create service-based media relations
13. Stay off the killing field:
Public issues of environmental and human health risk are communications killing fields for bioindustries in Europe. As a general rule, the industry voice cannot be expected to prevail in public opposition to adversarial voices on these issues. All the research evidence confirms that the perception of the profit motive fatally undermines industry’s credibility on these question. (This said, the evidence also shows that some companies are perceived as more ‘ethical’, and therefore as somewhat more credible, than others. But this perception typically attaches to brands, meaning either to specific consumer products or to retail brands, an important insight which adversaries well understand and to which we return in our agri-food sector proposal).
The difficulty of course is that today adversarial voices largely dominate in the public debate and, unsurprisingly, always chose this very killing fields, because they do enjoy high public credibility and because they know that direct industry rebuttal usually feeds the story instead of killing it. Therefore, a basic discipline of EuropaBio’s communications strategy must be to stay off these killing fields - no matter how provocative the invitation to enter upon them may be.
14. This is by no means to say, however, that this ground can be left undefended. Deepseated perceptions of risk will kill any product. But the industry must accept that it is for those charged with the public trust in this area - politicians and regulators - to assure the public that bio-industry products are safe. (This leads to a very specific problem for bioindustries in Europe today; the evidence clearly shows that Europeans do not trust their regulators in bio-product sectors. This is different from the U.S., where the EPA and FDA do enjoy widespread public confidence (which does not, however, extend to Europe). We return to this issue as well in the proposals which follow).
15. Create positive perceptions:
It no doubt seems banal to assert that until strong positive public perceptions of bio products are created in Europe, there will be no effective counterweight to the negative perceptions generated by adversaries on their chosen killing fields. It may seem doubly banal to add that positive perceptions dereived from perceived benefits. Nevertheless, all sucessful public affairs communications is predicated on these two apparent self-evidences. Understanding the words isn’t difficult. Obtaining objective insight into what they really mean for a given individual or group, and then having the discipline, organisation and determination to really apply them - that is what makes a difference.
Fight fire with fire
16. Stories-not issues: for EuropaBio to make the transition from effective policy interlocutor to effective public communicator, it is essential to shift from issues-based communications to stories-based communications. There are no issues-orientated media with any broad appeal, and the selling of complex issues coverage is a difficult task in any event because it contains little or no news value. Good stories, on the other hand, go around the world in minutes. That’s the way adversaries play. That’s the way industry must play.
17. Products-not technologies: stories must, moreover, focus largely on the products of the new technologies, because they are the only way most people connect (directly or indirectly) to the benefits of technology. (To recall: when SAGB published its communication on the environmental benefits of biotechnologies a few years ago, the biggest media up-take was on the specific product examples - and among them the most interest was generated by... household detergents!)
18. Beneficiaries - not benefits: product stories (as well as other sorts of stories) must focus on benefits, but these benefits must be personified. People stories are always the most compelling) recall the presence in Brussels during the Parlamentary voteon biotech patents of the fellow who claims to have had his genes ripped off without his permission).
19. Symbols - not logic: symbols are central to politics because they connect emotions, not logic. Adversaries of biotechnology are highly skilled in the cultivation of symbols eliciting instant emotions of fear, rage and resentment. Bioindustries need to respond in similar terms - with symbols eliciting hope, satisfaction, caring and self-esteem.
Create service-based media relations
20. Most reporters and editors do not have a personal agenda when it comes to coverage of biotechnology and bioindustries. Rather, as with any other beat, they are preoccupied with producing salable material under extreme deadline pressure. Deadlines dominate journalism, and largely shape what is reported.
21. EuropaBio must turn itself into the journalist’s best and most reliable continuing source of biotechnology/bioindustries inspiration and information - the first - stop help desk where they get no industry propaganda but practical, editor-pleasing, deadline-beating, connect to interesting stories and personalities - even adversarial - relevant to their readerships.
III. A EUROPABIO COMMUNICATIONS CAMPAIGN FOR THE AGRI-FOOD SECTOR
Urgency
22. A well-orchestrated effort to change current perceptions of agri-food biotechnology in Europe is urgent. There is no point in gradually ramping up a longer term Europa Bio communications programme only to find that in this key sector public attitudes, public policies and commercial practices have hardened beyond recall.
23. Adversaries remain determined, and their two-fold strategy remains clear: to split the food industry, and to balkanise the single market. 1997 will be a critical year, particularly because entry into force of the EU Novel Foods Regulation will precipitate a new and potentially divisive political debate over safety and transparency, as could the European Commission’s review of Directive 90/220/EEC. At the same time, supplies of certified non-GM soya will become difficult to obtain. It may also be anticipated that over the next 12 months the first genetically modified crop varieties destined for the food chain will become available for planting in Europe. That could offer new opportunities for adversaries to stage media events.
A front-loaded campaign
24. In view of these circumstances, we propose an intensive, front-loaded media campaign to begin as soon as practically possible, and to run up through and slightly beyond the June congress.
25. At that point, progress can be reviewed through analysis of media coverage over the period, and also the EuropaBio public attitude survey proposed as part of the longer- term communications programme.
Strategic frame-work
26. Our proposed agri-food campaign strategy is conceived around the vertical industrial and commercial chain: (starting at "the bottom") technology innovators-proprietors/ seed companies/ farmers/ commodity brokers/ food companies/ retail sector. It is further predicated on the following assessment of current public perceptions and attitudes (based on our own experience and the available research):
a. Within the chain, consumer "trust" attaches (if it attaches at all) to product brands and retail brands; therefore, the top two sectors of the chain are the two most effective direct channels of communications with the consumer.
b. In contrast, research reveals no public awareness or knowledge at all of the companies at the bottom of the chain (Monsanto, Ciba, Sandoz, PGS, etc.) - except what adversaries have been able to put into the public consciousness in recent month, all of which is intended to engender fear and distrust.
c. Food itself is a powerful vector of cultural -and even poltical- values, virtually everywhere in Europe. But these values differ from country to country. And in many parts of Europe there also exist a strong corresponding emotional attachement to idealised images of rural society, farming and the countryside.
d. There is virtually no understanding of the real purposes of the genetic modifications to the first crops now entering the European market. The general perception is that it has to do with increased profits for industry and maybe also farmers, but that it is a perversion of nature, motivated by greed at the bottom of the chain.
e. At the same time, there are very strong public perceptions of risk to human health attached to the idea of genetically modified food - heightened in certain countries by the living memory or current trauma of specific food-related crises (e.g. BSE, salmonella in Scotland, cooking oil in Spain).
f. Moreover, and to a surprising degree, the current climate of public suspicion and resentment surrounding the arrival on the European market of genetic modified soya and maize is shown by research to be rooted in the perception that dangerous, unnatural ingredients are being forced into traditional European food by the American chemical industry for reasons of pure profit, against the will of European consumers, and over the objections of at least part of the European retailing and food sectors. This reflects, of course, the drumbeat of adversarial media campaigning, exploiting certain objective facts of the situation.
27. The cumulative effect of these perceptions and attitudes has been to create a perfect incubator for public outrage and resentment over the introduction of genetically modified food (the actual strength of which, however, varies across Europe). The available evidence likewise supports the classic theory that these emotions are ultimately rooted in a sense of powerlessness in the face of what are perceived to be malevolent (and foreign) forces threatening facets of life held dear.
28. The bottom-line consequence of this is a (literal) chain-reaction in many parts of Europe; from the farming sector on up the chain; embracing the new technology is seen to be risky (and beeing the first to embrace is ssen especially risky), while beeing seen to refuse it looks a tempting marketing strategy (clean vs. dirty).
Strategic recommendations
29. Based upon this assessment of the perceptions and attitudes with which the agri-food interests in EuropaBio must contend, we make the following strategic recommendations for the conduct of the proposed front-loaded media campaign.
a. Companies in the food sector must be perceived by the public to have their own independent view, voice and scope of action on the introduction of genetically modified ingredients or organisms into their product ranges. They must be seen to have made a choice.
b. Food companies must also be seen to ensure that this power to choose is passed onto the consumer. This means "transparency" - product information made available to the consumer in some form. (We note that Europa Bio’s public statement following ratification by the European Parliament of the EU Novel Foods conciliation text leads very much in this direction). This in itself can largely defuse the sense of powerlessness which in large measure feeds the current climate of resentment and rejection.
c. Retailers must also be seen to occupy a similar position or independence vis à vis the rest of the chain - including food manufacturers, and must likewise adopt policies of transparency enabling consumer choice (i.e. empowerment). (Nobody instinctive understands this better than retailers themselves, which explains their recent public positioning on these issues).
d. By the same token, the supply-side sectors further down the chain must not themselves be heard to speak on behalf of the food and retail sectors, nor behave in any way which is seen to deny those sectors either their own independance of action or their ability to communicate with their customers.
(This is the great public perceptions pitfall in the "bottom-up" argument that separation is impossible. That argument is seen as a direct challenge to the power and independence of retailers and food companies. Nobody believes that retailers and the food companies cannot force separation if they collectively decide to. That perception places those sectors in an invidious position with their customers and with adversary groups - indeed, it is the wedge with which adversaries are attempting to split those sectors, and it works).
e. Rather the task of the sectors at the bottom of the chain is to help make it possible for both the food and retail sectors to explain their uptake GM foods in a way which at least does not violate the values of their customers, and at best responds positively to them. If that condition is met, and provided also that the products are both safe and seen to be safe, the great majority of consumers will have no further cause for outrage, and no reason to reject these products.
f. As noted, where safety is concerned there is no substitude for credible public regulators. It thus must become a strategic objective of this campaign to help build that credibility. And because the greatest consumer credibility within the industrial chain is carried by the branded sectors at the top, endorsements of the regulator’s integrity, competence and reliability should come only from them. The effectiveness of such endorsements will be further enhanced to the extend that they are also seen to be coming from parties who are not dependent on the regulator’s decision - i.e.who have the power of choice over the up-take of the product (assuming of course they do).
Regulatory endorsements from the bottom of the chain, on the other hand, are to be avoided because they contribute to the credibility-killing perception that those with the greatest self-interest control the regulators.
g. What only the lower sectors in the chain can do - and now must urgently do - is educate the public on why these food crops are beeing modified in the first place. Indeed, there is a great and bitter irony in the current situation in Europe: the products now causing the greatest furor were born from efforts to relieve environmental pressures brought on the farming sector by the very same militant organisations who today condemn them.
h. That adversaries have had considerable success in this bizarre form of infanticide is largeley a failure of public perceptions management in Europe at the bottom of the chain. In fact, recent research shows that Europeans are generally receptive when told that these new varieties can help reduce the use of agricultural chemicals. But most either simply have not understood that this is their primary technical and economic purpose at the level of the farm, or simply do not believe it when told (interpreting this message as nothing more than self- interested propaganda).
i. We therefore conclude that for this category of products (which includes virtually all those in the first wave of 90/220/EEC authorisations and is the real seat of the fire) it is both absolutely vital and perfectly achievable to position them in European public perceptions as environmentally superior to standard crop varieties and therefore desirable. j We are perfectly aware that adversaries have tried to discredit this positioning. But we can see absolutely no down-side risk in taking on the environmental lobby on this, it’s own turf. After all, if these new varieties do not prove to have chemical-displacing benefits they will fail in the market anyway. So, either they perform as advertised and the environmental case becomes incontrovertible, or they don’t perform, disappear from the market, and the case is closed.
k. Assuming this positioning were achieved (and that perceptions of risk are attenuated) it should then be perfectly possible for food companies and retailers to embrace these environmentally-superior ingredients - just as they do other inputs which respond to this demonstrated consumer value. Indeed, rather than behaving as though they have something to hide, why would they not actually want to tell the consumer they are using them?
l. We would even go so far as to consider whether retailers and food companies should not announce immediately that this basic environmental criterion will (or has) largely dictate their policy toward the use of ingredients from this class (once certified safe by the competent authorities). Up-take by the branded sectors might then come to be seen for what it actually will be - an ethical response to a real environmental problem about which consumers genuinely care. At that point, use of these ingredients would no longer threaten consumer confidence in their brands, and the labelling issue would become entirely moot.
m. We note in passing recent evidence showing that Europeans are less responsive to the argument that these new agricultural technologies will help feed the underfed and the generations yet unborn in other parts of the world. In our developed societies characterised by excess and surfeit, this benefit is not valued as highly as the environmental benefit, and we would not make it a focus of the agri-food media campaign.
n. Beyond the modified commodity crops now under scrutiny, there are of course other categories of genetically modified food products either already in European markets or headed for them. This will also need to be considered for treatment in the media campaign. But each will need to be considered on it’s own merits, because their consumer benefits will vary, and the appeal of those benefits may well vary across Europe.
o. Finally, we also strongly recommend strategic campaign focus by the bottom of the chain on carefully selected economic impact/benefits stories specific to their sectors. These may well need to play more locally across Europe, because that is where the greatest interest will always almost lie. But they can be used to great effect to build pockets of strong support. (To cite one extreme analogy, consider the political support generated by the tobacco industry in the U.S. in certain southern states).
30. In summary then we recommend:
Top of chain (food and retail):
Independent from suppliers (and each other)
Separation (choice) seen to be an option Support/endorse
regulators
Promote environmental
criterion
Bottom of chain:
Do not speak for top of chain
Defer to regulators
Do not be seen to fight separation
Concentrate
region-wide on environmental benefit
Concentrate locally
on economic benefits
Implementation
31. Focus of EuropaBio effort: the most urgent (and resource intensive) task in our view is to organise the bottom-of-chain-media campaigns on environmental and economic benefits. Top-of-chain communications may require less direct EuropaBio effort and involvement (although we stress their importance for the full strategy).
32. Pan-European strategy & individual Member State implementation: The bottom-of- chain campaign needs to be conceived and planned in a regional-wide framework, but actual media campaigns (for both environmental and economic benefits) will need to be tailored and conducted in target countries. This "localisation" of the stories is crucial not only to actually connect to consumers but also to overcome the perception that U.S. interests have co-opted an unwilling Europe. The environmental and economic benefits need to be interpreted and portrayed through story-telling in the national and local context, taking into account the cultural, historical and economic characteristics which determine public perceptions on the agri-food issue at those levels.
33. (For example, in Spain, the issue of water pollution is one of very few environmental issues of concern to the majority of Spaniards. Sensitivity on this issue is due in particular to historical water shortages. Media campaigning in Spain on the desirability of crop varieties requiring fewer pesticides can be effectively positioned to exploit this perceived vulnerability. However, such a specific positioning would be less relevant in Ireland, a country with an abundant water supply).
34. We see the following countries as first priority:
* France
* Germany
* Italy
* Spain
* U.K.
*
Belgium
* The Netherlands
* Ireland
* Denmark
Second priority include:
* Austria
* Finland
* Sweden
* Portugal
* Greece
* Norway
* Switzerland
35. We propose that the campaign in the UK and Ireland is be run three to four weeks ahead of implementation in other countries, in order to ensure that lessons learned can be applied elsewhere.
Start-up and operational approach
36. Using the Burson Marsteller bio-issues network, we need to review the media coverage at regional and target-country level over the last eighteen months - essentially to pinpoint key media outlets and individuals. We will also need to review previous communications efforts made by EuropaBio, SAGB, ESNBA, and individual members, in adressing public concern over agri-food biotechnology.
37. We will also need to review with EuropaBio task force members the list of forthcoming new agri-food sector applications, and to map them for their potential interest profile by country and for Europe. (For example, a genetically engineered mediterranean crop would be dealt with differently from a northern european cereal).
38. Story opportunities can then be selected and developed for both region-wide and local placement (keeping in mind that basic principles for generating news value and managing media relations). This will involve particularly identifying both bio-industry and third party spokes people willing and able to contribute to the story.
39. Effort will then shift to actual media placement for potential story. The mix will typically include a selection from trade press, and local, regional and national media, including print, radio and television.
A campaign plan
40. Hereunder we present a draft campaign plan to show how it would run in practise:
Weeks 1-2
* Review of current journalistic opinion in all markets
*
Compile list of applications due into market place in the next three
years * Correlate with regions of use
Weeks 2-4
* Prompt media use in trade press of relevant sector
*
Prepare economic and environment case
* Tailor case to specific
regions of use providing local news hooks and personal story
Weeks 4-8
* Place story with local/regional radio and press
* Collate
coverage in a package to demonstrate "growing interest around the
country"
* Present national journalists with evidence of interest
and fresh ’national’ story
* Introduce link to International
Congress
* Maintain ‘firefighting’ capacity for instant response to
critical stories in all markets
Weeks 8-12
* Stories now have life of own requiring management rather than
prompting
* Integrate with preparations for Congress
* Prepare
schedule of all journalists providing positive coverage weeks 1-12 *
Correlate speakers/experts at congress with coverage
* Prepare new
follow up story linking local story to international congress
Weeks 12-16
* Seek local/regional coverage that has ‘taken off’ on issue and
convert into national story
* Take national stories with cross
boarder application and use in other markets, having modified in the
light of experience
* Ramp up reference to Congress
Weeks 16-20
* Sell in congress to media
* ‘Teaser’ release to all radio,
TV stations in Europe * Follow press release with sample local stories
and description of remote facilities to conduct interviews with key
congress experts
Weeks 20-22
* Arrange radio interview schedule
* Prepare standard TV
shots of Congress venue and key speakers for distribution to TV channels
for’cut in’ with local story
* Seek plots in ‘specialist’ programmes
(farmers programmes, science reviews, business news etc.)
CONGRESS
Weeks 23-28
* Manage Congress follow up
* Provide guests from Congress to
prompt follow up storied in national, regional media
* Respond where
appropriate to critical coverage
* Press release an ‘astonishing’
response to Congress including tailored quotes eg. "Congress indicates
huge economic growth potential of *Biotech in our area says Mayor"
Weeks 28-30
* Collate total coverage for assessment
* Prepare draft plan
for next six months with EuropaBio
Fee structure and estimate:
41. Fees for the time of B-M professionals would need to cover involvement at the EuropaBio task force level and at the level of individual country campaigns. Fee estimates cover the time involved in the preparation, implementation and review of the agreed media strategy and all necessary expenses, including travel.
42. Actual fees will depend largely on the number and identity of the countries targeted, as well as the extend of the role B-M core-team professionals would be expected to play at EuropaBio level and in-country.
43. For fee estimation purposes, countries beeing targeted in the campaign are divided into two levels; factors used to determine fee level are market size, influence of media at both national and international level and importance of market to success or failure of biotechnology in the agri-food business. We see the breakdown as follws:
Central Co-ordinating budget $ 400.000
Category A $ 150.000 per country
UK/France/Germany/Italy
Category B $ 80.000 per country
Spain/Ireland/Belgium/Netherlands/Portugal/Greece/Switzerland/Sweden/Denmark/ Finland/Austria
IV. A COMMUNICATIONS INITIATIVE FOR THE JUNE CONGRESS
Objective:
44. The practical objective of this initiative should be media coverage of positive bioindustry stories before, during and after the congress, but not media attendance at or coverage of the Congress per se.
45. In particular: EUROPABIO must at all cost avoid creating a media-centered event which will automatically draw protesting environmental groups to the Amsterdam venue. The result of that would certainly be considerable media coverage - but inevitably focusing on the conflict surrounding biotechnology (the killing field). EuropaBio will have set the table, and Greenpeace will have eaten the lunch.
46. Moreover, assembling a large body of non-local media in Amsterdam would entail logistical difficulties of no small scale, as well as considerable added time and cost, with no guarantee of success.
Practical approach:
47. Keeping in mind the common principles outlined in section II, our practical recommendation is based on three factors:
+ Media attendance in Amsterdam is not necessary for coverage (and as pointed out is dangerous and costly).
+ There is little pan-European media. Virtually all key targets (for any EuropaBio communications initiative) will be national (although we would seek coverage in the FT.Economist, Sky Television, CNN, etc.), because national media are by far the most effective vehicle for EuropaBio originated stories.
+ In the full B-M scenario, the agri-food campaign would already be up and running.
48. Therefore:
+ Media coverage should not be about the congress per se. Rather, preliminary work would focus on identifying bio-product and bio-industry stories of national and local interest for target member states, which also connect to one or more themes of the congress - which will be virtually any story selected.
+ Agri-food stories would presumably already be up and running by June. Additional Conference-specific, story.based, communications effort would then focus on other EuropaBio sectors (health care, industrial processing, environmental remediation), and also on key horizontal issues (entrepreneurism, capital markets, global competition, job creation and job market, educational opportunities, BT & IT).
We foresee the need to develop a (vertical) x (horizontal) x (location) story matrix in order to make certain that the proper balance is struck in the selection of those selected for placement. And as in the agri-food campaign all stories will need to be thoroughly vetted for their accuracy and vulnerability to hostile reaction.
+ Stories would then be moved directly in-country to national and local media with, however, arrangements being made for added commentary on them by appropriate spokespeople from the congress, using "down the line" interview techniques concentrated on national radio and TV. In this way, multiple member state coverage from the congress can be ensured without actually assembling a large media presence in Amsterdam.
49. We believe the primary target media should be radio, for three reasons:
+ The environment movement deliberately does not target the radio because it is very difficult to attract attention i.e. demonstrations rarely get covered by the radio because they can’t film them. Additionally, the radio, by it’s very nature, is verbal and this usually means considerably more then cerebral than TV. The "packages" given to any particular issue are much longer. Sometimes by a multiple of 5 or 6 times. Which is precisely what we need.
+ There are far more listening hours than viewing hours right the way across Europe. This often comes as a great surprise to people but it is in fact true. In other words, we will get much broader coverage by concentrating on radio than by concentrating on TV.
+ Although we do not want to concentrate media interest on the Congress itself, the Congress creates an excellent news hook for the stories we really want running "back home". Furthermore, it should be perfectly possible and manageable to schedule interviews with people attending the Congress with radio stations all over Europe.
This has three advantages: 1. the Congress is referred to in all of the stories that play 2. we control the choice of commentators discussing the local story and the relevance of the Congress to it 3. the Congress link emphasises the European dimension of the local story and allows us to introduce the broader competitive issues in all of those interviews.
50. A similar approach can be taken for TV, relying on the daily feed to national networks of standard footage from the Congress, shot by us, to supplement related national interest stories already place to run that evening or the following morning. Again, this should generate considerable simultaneous coverage across Europe, but without the risks associated with the presence of live TV crews looking for conflict.
51. Finally, print media can be dealt with in a similar fashion (including down-the-line interviews), but we would not place strategic emphasis on recruiting their interest. A basic information kit can be distributed ahead of the event. Those who respond with interest can then be served.
Fee structure and estimate
52. It is difficult at this point to judge the degree of overlap/synergy in a scenario where the agri-food campaign and the Congress campaign run together through July (and where both involve Burson Marsteller). Nevertheless, at this stage we offer the following estimate for the Congress approach described above, as a stand alone.
Central co-ordinating budget $ 100.000
Category A countries $ 40.000
Category B countries $ 20.000
53. The lower estimate for the Congress results from the differing intensity of the two initiatives: Congress work targets a period of media coverage of roughly a week, with prelimenary work building toward that objective; the 6 month agri-food campaign seeks to catalyse rapid and sustained communication over a large portion of Europe over several months.
V. LONG TERM EUROPABIO COMMUNICATIONS PROGRAMME
Relationship between the three proposed initiatives
54. Assuming both the rapid start-up of the agri-food campaign proposed in Section III and implementation of the Congress-linked initiative proposed in Section IV, and further assuming that each is predicated on the common principles laid out in Section I, the two shorter term initiatives should lay a strong operational and experiential foundation for building a sustained, long term communications programme.
55. We therefore strongly recommend that the twin initiatives leading up to and through Congress be considered together also as "Phase I" of the longer-term programme. (The two running together may in any event be anticipated to consume all available resources through until the end of July 1997.)
Core components of long-term capability
56. This being in our view the sensible way to view the immediate future, the important question for the longer-term is what the core components of EuropaBio’s longer-term communiactions capability should be. Moreover, despite the fact that we are now thinking about the longer-term, some consensus on the answer to this question from the outset of the two shorter-term start-up initiatives will help channel those "Phase I" efforts much more deliberately toward laying the longer-term foundations. In short, we need to know where we intend to go from the beginning.
57. B-M have deep and highly relevant experience and the creation of sustained industry- initiated Europe-wide public affairs communications programmes. The first lesson we recommend to EuropaBio is simply that success requires significant commitment. The cost of true campaigning look high, but the magnitude of the potential payoffs are a multiple of the investment. In one highly relevant case from our experience, the public and market perceptions of the environmental liabilities of a particular product - fanned by concerted Greenpeace campaigning - had put it on a death-watch list in Europe. A three-year campaign funded by an alliance of competitors and up-stream suppliers turned that perception around, to the point where today the product is widely seen as part of the environmental solution.
58. Beyond commitment, we strongly recommend the developement of the following core componenets:
a. A fully functioning communications strategy group within EuropaBio, and the operational resources necessary to go from strategy to effective action.
b. A hub-spoke network built around the strategy group and funded centrally but with the authority to allocate its resources to national level as a function of central strategy and decision-making.
c. Internally "neutral" operational leaders/spokespeople for the organisation both at the hub and in-country. At the EuropaBio hub, this role is by definition filled by the Secretary General. In country, the assignment of this role may be less obvious (although National Association heads may be the obvious choice where present). This role can be effectively filled by the outside partner agency, as B-M has done in many different campaigns.
d. An institutionalised public attitudes research programme, to run at standard intervals.
e. A well-organised media service centre, ideally able to connect and communicate at national level on the basis of assets and tools run at the hub.
f. The hub operation will normally oversee the developement and day-to-day running of whatever common information and media-relations tools are created. These may include: periodical publications of EuropaBio; a EuropaBio Web- site; a Bio-industries data base; creation and dissemenation of EuropaBio press communications; central management of media contact lists, periodic (ideally daily) media monitoring (perhaps off the back of members’ existing capabilities; a number of different models for this capability can be looked at.).
The B-M role
59. The primary value of B-M over the longer term will be at the level of the central strategy group. The basic nature of the responsibility of this group will be what we at B-M call "perceptions management". This needs to be seen as a senior management discipline just like marketing management or financial management. And just as marketing managers typically partner with advertising firms, or financial managers with particular financial service providers, so perceptions managers benefit from the skills and experience available through sustained partnership with Burson Marsteller.
60. Beyond the core relationship at the strategy and planning level, the assignment of any specific task to B-M professionals (or other third party suppliers) would depend entirely on the nature of the work to be done and agreement that B-M are the best choice for doing it.